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2Abstract
The ability to exchange secret information is critical to many commercial, governmental, and
military networks. The intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph) is a random graph which
describes the connections that can be securely established over a large-scale network, by exploiting
the physical properties of the wireless medium. This paper aims to characterize the global properties
of the iS-graph in terms of: (i) percolation on the infinite plane, and (ii) full connectivity on a finite
region. First, for the Poisson iS-graph defined on the infinite plane, the existence of a phase transition
is proven, whereby an unbounded component of connected nodes suddenly arises as the density of
legitimate nodes is increased. This shows that long-range secure communication is still possible in
the presence of eavesdroppers. Second, full connectivity on a finite region of the Poisson iS-graph is
considered. The exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate
nodes is characterized. Then, simple, explicit expressions are derived in order to closely approximate
the probability of full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes. The results help clarify how
the presence of eavesdroppers can compromise long-range secure communication.
Index Terms
Physical-layer security, wireless networks, stochastic geometry, percolation, connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary security systems for wireless networks are based on cryptographic primitives
that generally ignore two key factors: (a) the physical properties of the underlying communication
channels, and (b) the spatial configuration of both the legitimate and malicious nodes. These two
factors are important since they affect the propagation channels between the nodes, which in
turn determine the fundamental secrecy potential of a wireless network. In fact, the randomness
introduced both by the physics of the wireless medium and by the spatial location of the nodes
can be leveraged to strengthen the overall security of the communications infrastructure.1
The basis for information-theoretic security, which builds on the notion of perfect secrecy [1],
was laid in [2] and later in [3], [4]. More recently, there has been a renewed interest in
1In the literature, the term “security” typically encompasses 3 different characteristics: secrecy (or privacy), integrity, and
authenticity. This paper does not consider the issues of integrity or authenticity, and the terms “secrecy” and “security” are used
interchangeably.
3information-theoretic security over wireless channels, from the perspective of space-time com-
munications [5], multiple-input multiple-output communications [6]–[10], eavesdropper collu-
sion [11], [12], cooperative relay networks [13], fading channels [14]–[18], strong secrecy [19],
[20], secret key agreement [21]–[25], code design [26]–[28], among other topics. A fundamental
limitation of this literature is that it only considers scenarios with a small number of nodes. To ac-
count for large-scale networks composed of multiple legitimate and eavesdropper nodes, secrecy
graphs were introduced in [29] from a geometrical perspective, and in [30] from an information-
theoretic perspective. The local connectivity of secrecy graphs was extensively characterized in
[31], while the scaling laws of the secrecy capacity were presented in [32], [33].
Percolation theory studies the existence of phase transitions in random graphs, whereby an
infinite cluster of connected nodes suddenly arises as some system parameter is varied. Various
percolation models have been considered in the literature. The Poisson Boolean model was
introduced in [34], which derived the first bounds on the critical density, and started the field of
continuum percolation. The Poisson random connection model was introduced and analyzed in
[35]. The Poisson nearest neighbour model was considered in [36]. The signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) model was characterized in [37]. A comprehensive study of the various
models and results in continuum percolation can be found in [38].
The connectivity of large but finite networks has also received attention the literature. The
asymptotic behavior of partial connectivity of the Poisson Boolean model restricted to a finite
box was studied in [39]. The asymptotic full connectivity of the same model was analyzed in
[40], [41], which obtained the rate of growth of the radius that ensures full connectivity. The
asymptotic full connectivity in finite nearest neighbour networks was considered in [42], [43].
In this paper, we characterize long-range secure connectivity in wireless networks by consid-
ering the intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph) as defined in [31]. The iS-graph
describes the connections that can be established with information-theoretic security over a large-
scale network. We focus on percolation of the iS-graph on the infinite plane, and full connectivity
in a finite region. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Percolation in the iS-graph: We prove the existence of a phase transition in the Poisson
iS-graph defined on the infinite plane, whereby an unbounded component of connected
nodes suddenly arises as we increase the density of legitimate nodes. In particular, we
determine for which combinations of system parameters does percolation occur. This shows
4that long-range communication is still possible in a wireless network when a secrecy
constraint is present.
• Full connectivity in the iS-graph: We analyze secure full connectivity on a finite region of
the Poisson iS-graph. We characterize the exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in
the limit of a large density of legitimate nodes. Then, we obtain simple, explicit expressions
that closely approximate the probability of full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate
nodes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III character-
izes continuum percolation in the Poisson iS-graph defined over the infinite plane. Section IV
analyzes full connectivity in the Poisson iS-graph restricted to a finite region. Section V con-
cludes the paper and summarizes important findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We start by describing our system model and defining our measures of secrecy. The notation
and symbols used throughout the paper are summarized in Table I.
A. Wireless Propagation Characteristics
In a wireless environment, the received power Prx(xi, xj) associated with the link −−→xixj can
modeled as
Prx(xi, xj) = Pℓ · g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj), (1)
where Pℓ is the (common) transmit power of the legitimate nodes; and g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) is the
power gain of the link −−→xixj , where the random variable (RV) Zxi,xj represents the random
propagation effects (such as multipath fading or shadowing) associated with link −−→xixj . The
channel gain g(xi, xj, Zxi,xj) is considered constant (quasi-static) throughout the use of the
communications channel, corresponding to channels with a large coherence time. The gain
function is assumed to satisfy the following conditions, which are typically observed in practice:
1) g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) depends on xi and xj only through the link length |xi − xj |; with abuse
of notation, we can write g(r, z) , g(xi, xj , z)||xi−xj |→r.
2) g(r, z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in r.
3) limr→∞ g(r, z) = 0.
5The proposed model is general enough to account for common choices of g. One example is
the unbounded model where g(r, z) = z
r2b
. The term 1
r2b
accounts for the far-field path loss with
distance, where the amplitude loss exponent b is environment-dependent and can approximately
range from 0.8 (e.g., hallways inside buildings) to 4 (e.g., dense urban environments), with b = 1
corresponding to free space propagation. This model is analytically convenient [44], but since
the gain becomes unbounded as the distance approaches zero, it must be used with care for
extremely dense networks. Another example is the bounded model where g(r, z) = z
1+r2b
. This
model has the same far-field dependence as the unbounded model, but eliminates the singularity
at the origin. Unfortunately, it often leads to intractable analytical results. The effect of the
singularity at r = 0 on the performance evaluation of a wireless system is considered in [45].
B. Wireless Information-Theoretic Security
We now define our measure of secrecy more precisely. While our main interest is targeted
towards the behavior of large-scale networks, we briefly review the setup for a single legitimate
link with a single eavesdropper. The results therein will serve as basis for the notion of iS-graph
to be established later.
Consider the model depicted in Fig. 1, where a legitimate user (Alice) wants to send messages
to another user (Bob). Alice encodes a message s, represented by a discrete RV, into a codeword,
represented by the complex random sequence of length n, xn = (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ Cn, for
transmission over the channel. Bob observes the output of a discrete-time channel (the legitimate
channel), which at time i is given by
yℓ(i) = hℓ · x(i) + nℓ(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where hℓ ∈ C is the quasi-static amplitude gain of the legitimate channel,2 and nℓ(i) ∼ Nc(0, σ2ℓ )
is AWGN with power σ2ℓ per complex sample.3 Bob makes a decision sˆ on s based on the
output yℓ, incurring in an error probability equal to P{sˆℓ 6= s}. A third party (Eve) is also
2The amplitude gain hℓ can be related to the power gain in (1) as g(rℓ, Zℓ) = |hℓ|2, where rℓ and Zℓ are, respectively, the
length and random propagation effects of the legitimate link.
3We use Nc(0, σ2) to denote a circularly symmetric (CS) complex Gaussian distribution, where the real and imaginary parts
are IID N (0, σ2/2).
6capable of eavesdropping on Alice’s transmissions. Eve observes the output of a discrete-time
channel (the eavesdropper’s channel), which at time i is given by
ye(i) = he · x(i) + ne(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where he ∈ C is the quasi-static amplitude gain of the eavesdropper channel, and ne(i) ∼
Nc(0, σ2e ) is AWGN with power σ2e per complex sample. It is assumed that the signals x, hℓ,
he, nℓ, and ne are mutually independent. Each codeword transmitted by Alice is subject to the
average power constraint of Pℓ per complex symbol, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E{|x(i)|2} ≤ Pℓ. (2)
We define the rate of transmission as
R ,
H(s)
n
,
where H(·) denotes the entropy function.
Throughout the paper, we use strong secrecy as the condition for information-theoretic security,
and define it as follows [19].
Definition 2.1 (Strong Secrecy): The rate R∗ is said to be achievable with strong secrecy if
∀ǫ > 0, for sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder-decoder pair with rate R satisfying the
following conditions:
R ≥ R∗ − ǫ,
H(s|yne ) ≥ H(s)− ǫ,
P{sˆℓ 6= s} ≤ ǫ.
We define the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) Rs of the legitimate channel to be the maximum
rate R∗ that is achievable with strong secrecy.4 If the legitimate link operates at a rate below
the MSR Rs, there exists an encoder-decoder pair such that the eavesdropper is unable to obtain
additional information about s from the observation yne , in the sense that H(s|yne ) approaches
4See [20] for a comparison between the concepts of weak and strong secrecy. In the case of Gaussian noise, the MSR is the
same under the weak and strong secrecy conditions.
7H(s) as the codeword length n grows. It was shown in [4], [17] that for a given realization of
the channel gains hℓ, he, the MSR of the Gaussian wiretap channel is
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · |hℓ|2
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · |he|2
σ2e
)]+
, (3)
in bits per complex dimension, where [x] = max{x, 0}.5 In the next sections, we use these basic
results to analyze secrecy in large-scale networks.
C. iS-Graph
Consider a wireless network where the legitimate nodes and the potential eavesdroppers are
randomly scattered in space, according to some point processes. The iS-graph is a convenient
representation of the information-theoretically secure links that can be established on such
network. In the following, we introduce a precise definition of the iS-graph, based on the notion
of strong secrecy.
Definition 2.2 (iS-Graph [31]): Let Πℓ = {xi}∞i=1 ⊂ Rd denote the set of legitimate nodes,
and Πe = {ei}∞i=1 ⊂ Rd denote the set of eavesdroppers. The iS-graph is the directed graph G =
{Πℓ, E} with vertex set Πℓ and edge set
E = {−−→xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺}, (4)
where ̺ is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum secrecy rate for each communication
link; and Rs(xi, xj) is the MSR, for a given realization of the channel gains, of the link between
the transmitter xi and the receiver xj , given by
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, xj)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, e
∗)
σ2e
)]+
, (5)
with
e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
Prx(xi, ek). (6)
This definition presupposes that the eavesdroppers are not allowed to collude (i.e., they cannot
exchange or combine information), and therefore only the eavesdropper with the strongest
5Operationally, the MSR Rs can be achieved if Alice first estimates hℓ and he (i.e., has full CSI), and then uses a code that
achieves MSR in the AWGN channel. Estimation of he is possible, for instance, when Eve is another active user in the wireless
network, so that Alice can estimate the eavesdropper’s channel during Eve’s transmissions. As we shall see, the iS-graph model
presented in this paper relies on an outage formulation, and therefore does not require assumptions concerning availability of
full CSI.
8received signal from xi determines the MSR between xi and xj . The effect of eavesdropper
collusion on the local connectivity of the iS-graph is analyzed in [31].
The iS-graph admits an outage interpretation, in the sense that legitimate nodes set a target
secrecy rate ̺ at which they transmit without knowing the channel state information (CSI) of
the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. In this context, an edge between two nodes signifies
that the corresponding channel is not in secrecy outage.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider the case where the following conditions hold:
(a) the wireless environment introduces only path loss, i.e., Zxi,xj = 1 in (1); and (b) the noise
powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal, i.e., σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2. In such case,
we can combine (1), (4), and (5) to obtain the following edge set6
E =
{−−→xixj : g(|xi − xj |) > 2̺g(|xi − e∗|) + σ2
P
(2̺ − 1), e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
, (7)
where e∗ denotes the eavesdropper closest to the transmitter xi. The particular case of ̺ = 0
corresponds to considering the existence of secure links, in the sense that an edge −−→xixj is present
iff Rs(xi, xj) > 0. Thus, a positive (but possibly small) rate exists at which xi can transmit to
xj with information-theoretic security. In this case, the edge set in (7) simplifies to
E =
{−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
, (8)
which corresponds to the geometrical model proposed in [29]. Fig. 2(a) shows an example of
such an iS-graph on R2.
The spatial location of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes can be modeled either determin-
istically or stochastically. In many important scenarios, only a statistical description of the node
positions is available, and thus a stochastic spatial model is more suitable. In particular, when
the node positions are unknown to the network designer a priori, we may as well treat them
as completely random according to a homogeneous Poisson point process [46].7 The Poisson
process has maximum entropy among all homogeneous processes [47], and serves as a simple
and useful model for the position of nodes in a network [44], [48].
6For notational simplicity, when Z = 1, we omit the second argument of the function g(r, z) and simply use g(r).
7The spatial Poisson process is a natural choice in such situation because, given that a node is inside a region R, the PDF of
its position is conditionally uniform over R.
9Definition 2.3 (Poisson iS-graph): The Poisson iS-graph is an iS-graph where Πℓ,Πe ⊂ Rd
are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λℓ and λe,
respectively.
In the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise indicated), we focus on Poisson iS-graphs on
R2.
III. PERCOLATION IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
Percolation theory studies the behaviour of the connected components in random graphs.
Typically, a continuum percolation model consists of an underlying point process defined on the
infinite plane, and a rule that describes how connections are established between the nodes [38]. A
main property of all percolation models is that they exhibit a phase transition as some continuous
parameter is varied. If this parameter is the density λ of nodes, then the phase transition occurs
at some critical density λc. When λ < λc, denoted as the subcritical phase, all the clusters
are a.s. bounded.8 When λ > λc, denoted as the supercritical phase, the graph exhibits a.s. an
unbounded cluster of nodes, or in other words, the graph percolates.
Percolation theory plays an important role in the study of connectivity in multi-hop wireless
networks, where the formation of an infinite component of connected nodes is desirable for
communication over arbitrarily long distances. In the literature, percolation—and therefore long-
range communication—was shown to occur in the following models, all of them driven by a
Poisson point process:
1) Boolean model [34], where two nodes are directly connected iff their distance is smaller
than a fixed radius r. This can be used to model unsecured communication subject to a
minimum received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), in the absence of fading.
2) Random connection model [35], where each pair of nodes is directly connected with some
probability p(r) depending only on their distance r, and independently of every other pair.
This can be used to model unsecured communication in the presence of fading, subject to
a minimum received SNR.
3) SINR model [37], where two nodes are directly connected if the SINR exceeds the same
threshold at both ends. This can be used to model unsecured communication subject to a
8We say that an event occurs “almost surely” (a.s.) if its probability is equal to one.
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minimum received SINR, in the absence of fading.
4) Nearest neighbour model [36], where each node connects to its k nearest neighbours. This
can be used to model unsecured communication in a centralized network where a power
control scheme ensures connectivity to the k nearest nodes only.
In this section, we focus on the iS-graph model, and show that long-range communication with
information-theoretic security is feasible in the presence of eavesdroppers. The mathematical
characterization of the iS-graph presents two challenges: i) unlike the models 1–4 above, the
iS-graph is a directed graph, which leads to the study of directed percolation; and ii) similarly to
models 3 and 4, the iS-graph exhibits dependencies between the state of different edges, which
leads to the study of dependent percolation.
In what follows, we start by introducing some definitions, then present and prove the main
theorem concerning percolation in the iS-graph, and lastly illustrate the percolation phenomenon
with various simulation results. The study of full connectivity in the iS-graph over a finite domain
(as opposed to percolation in the infinite plane) is also of interest, and is considered in Section IV.
A. Definitions
Graphs: As before, we use G = {Πℓ, E} to denote the (directed) iS-graph with vertex
set Πℓ and edge set given in (4). In addition, we define two undirected graphs: the weak
iS-graph Gweak = {Πℓ, Eweak} , where
Eweak = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∨Rs(xj , xi) > ̺},
and the strong iS-graph Gstrong = {Πℓ, E strong}, where
E strong = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∧Rs(xj , xi) > ̺}.
The graph Gweak represents the links where secure unidirectional communication is possible
with an MSR greater than ̺. The graph Gstrong, on the other hand, represents the links where
secure bidirectional communication is possible with an MSR greater than ̺. The various types
of iS-graphs are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Graph Components: While the notion of “component” is unambiguous in undirected graphs,
some subtleties arise in directed graphs. Specifically, the notion of component is not clear in
a directed graph, because even if node x can reach y through a sequence of directed edges,
11
that does not imply that y can reach x. We can, however, generalize the notion of component
associated with undirected graphs by defining 4 different graph components for the iS-graph.
In what follows, we use the notation x G→ y to represent a path from node x to node y in a
directed graph G, and x G∗— y to represent a path between node x and node y in an undirected
graph G∗. Let the out-component Kout(x) of node x be the set of nodes which can be reached
from node x in the iS-graph G, i.e.,
Kout(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ x G→ y}. (9)
Similarly, let the in-component Kin of node x be the set of nodes from which node x can be
reached in the iS-graph G, i.e.,
Kin(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ y G→ x}. (10)
Let the weak component Kweak(x) be the set of nodes which are connected to node x in the
weak iS-graph Gweak, i.e.,
Kweak(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ x Gweak— y}. (11)
Let the strong component Kstrong(x) be the set of nodes which are connected to node x in the
strong iS-graph Gstrong, i.e.,
Kstrong(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ x Gstrong— y}. (12)
From these definitions, it is clear that for a given realization of Πℓ and Πe the following properties
hold for any x:
Kstrong(x) ⊆ Kout(x) ⊆ Kweak(x), (13)
Kstrong(x) ⊆ Kin(x) ⊆ Kweak(x), (14)
These properties are illustrated in Fig. 9(c).9
9In the literature, the weak and strong components of node x are sometimes defined differently as
Kweak(x) , {y ∈ Π : ∃x
G
→ y ∨ ∃ y
G
→ x} = Kout(x) ∪ Kin(x),
and
Kstrong(x) , {y ∈ Π : ∃ x
G
→ y ∧ ∃ y
G
→ x} = Kout(x) ∩ Kin(x).
In this paper, we prefer the definitions in (11) and (12), since they only depend on the respective undirected graphs Gweak and
Gstrong, and do not require explicit knowledge of G. As we shall see, this choice will simplify many of the derivations, namely
by allowing us to translate an analysis of directed graphs into one of undirected graphs.
12
Percolation Probabilities: To study the percolation in the iS-graph, it is useful to define
percolation probabilities associated with the four graph components. Such probabilities depend
on the MSR threshold ̺, and the node densities λℓ and λe. Specifically, let pout∞ , pin∞, pweak∞ , and
pstrong∞ respectively be the probabilities that the in, out, weak, and strong components containing
node x = 0 have an infinite number of nodes, i.e.,10
p⋄∞(λℓ, λe, ̺) , P{|K⋄(0)| =∞},
where ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}.11 Our goal is to study the properties and behavior of these
percolation probabilities.
B. Main Result
We now investigate the percolation phenomenon in the iS-graph. Specifically, we aim to
determine if percolation in the iS-graph is possible, and if so, for which combinations of system
parameters (λℓ, λe, ̺) does it occur. The result is given by the following main theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Phase Transition in the iS-Graph): For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying
0 ≤ ̺ < ̺max , log2
(
1 +
P · g(0)
σ2
)
, (15)
there exist critical densities λoutc , λinc , λweakc , λstrongc satisfying
0 < λweakc ≤ λoutc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (16)
0 < λweakc ≤ λinc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (17)
such that
p⋄∞ = 0, for λℓ < λ⋄c, (18)
p⋄∞ > 0, for λℓ > λ⋄c, (19)
for any ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}. Conversely, if ̺ > ̺max, then p⋄∞ = 0 for any λℓ, λe.
To prove the theorem, we introduce the following three lemmas.
10We condition on the event that a legitimate node is located at x = 0. According to Slivnyak’s theorem [49, Sec. 4.4], apart
from the given point at x = 0, the probabilistic structure of the conditioned process is identical to that of the original process.
11Except where otherwise indicated, in the rest of the paper we use the symbol ⋄ to represent the out, in, weak, or strong
component.
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Lemma 3.1: For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying (15), there exists an ǫ > 0 such that pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0
for all λℓ < ǫ.
Proof: Due to its length, the proof is postponed to Section III-C.
Lemma 3.2: For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying (15), there exists a ζ <∞ such that pstrong∞ (λℓ) >
0 for all λℓ > ζ .
Proof: Due to its length, the proof is postponed to Section III-D.
Lemma 3.3: For any λe > 0 and ̺ ≥ 0, the percolation probability p⋄∞(λℓ) is a non-decreasing
function of λℓ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
With these lemmas we are now in condition to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We first show that if ̺ > ̺max, then p⋄∞ = 0. The MSR Rs of a
link −−→xixj , given in (5), is upper bounded by the channel capacity R of a link with zero length,
i.e., Rs(xi, xj) ≤ R (xi, xi) = log2
(
1 + P ·g(0)
σ2
)
. If the threshold ̺ is set such that ̺ > ̺max,
the condition Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ in (4) for the existence of the edge −−→xixj is never satisfied by
any xi, xj . Thus, the iS-graph G has no edges and cannot percolate. We now consider the
case of 0 ≤ ̺ < ̺max. From properties (13) and (14), we have pstrong∞ ≤ pout∞ ≤ pweak∞ and
pstrong∞ ≤ pin∞ ≤ pweak∞ . Then, Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 imply that each curve p⋄∞(λℓ) departs
from the zero value at some critical density λ⋄c , as expressed by (18) and (19). Furthermore,
these critical densities are nontrivial in the sense that 0 < λ⋄c < ∞. The ordering of critical
densities in (16) and (17) follows from similar coupling arguments.
We now present some remarks on Theorem 3.1. The theorem shows that each of the four
components of the iS-graph experiences a phase transition at some critical density λ⋄c . These
critical densities are nontrivial, in the sense that 0 < λ⋄c < ∞. As we increase the density λℓ
of legitimate nodes, the component Kweak(0) percolates first, then Kout(0) or Kin(0), and finally
Kstrong(0). Furthermore, percolation can occur for any prescribed infimum secrecy rate ̺, as
long as it is below the channel capacity of a link with zero length, i.e., ̺max. This has different
implications depending on the type of path loss model, as presented in Section II-A:
• If g(0) =∞, percolation can occur for any arbitrarily large secrecy requirement ̺, as long
as the density λℓ of legitimate nodes is made large enough.
• If g(0) <∞, percolation cannot occur if the threshold ̺ is set above ̺max = log2 (1 + SNR · g(0)),
where SNR , P
σ2
. To ensure percolation for such ̺, the signal-to-noise-ratio SNR must be
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increased until ̺max(SNR) decreases below the desired ̺. At that point, the density λℓ can
then be increased to achieve percolation.
Note that the theorem holds for any channel gain function g(r) satisfying Conditions 1–3 in
Section II-A, including bounded and unbounded models. Concerning the density λe of eaves-
droppers, the theorem says that as long as ̺ < ̺max, percolation can occur even in scenarios
with arbitrarily dense eavesdroppers. This can be achieved just by deploying more legitimate
nodes, so that λℓ is large enough.
Operationally, the theorem is important because it shows that long-range secure communication
over multiple hops is still feasible, even in the presence of arbitrarily dense eavesdroppers. In
particular, if we limit communication to the secure links whose MSR exceeds ̺ (chosen such
that ̺ < ̺max), then for λℓ large enough, a component with an infinite number of securely-
connected nodes arises. Those nodes are able to communicate with strong secrecy (in the sense
of Definition 2.1), at a rate greater than ̺ bits per complex channel use. The specific type of the
secure connection (e.g., unidirectional or bidirectional) depends on the graph component under
consideration: out, in, weak, or strong component.
C. Proof of Lemma 3.1
In this section, we introduce a few definitions and propositions, which are then used to prove
the lemma. Note that the graph Gweak(̺) depends on ̺, and it is sufficient to show that Gweak(̺)
for the case of ̺ = 0 does not percolate for sufficiently small λℓ. This is because for larger ̺
the connectivity of Gweak(̺) is worse and thus Gweak(̺) certainly does not percolate either. We
then proceed in two intermediate steps. First, we map the continuous iS-graph G onto a discrete
hexagonal lattice Lh, and declare a face in Lh to be closed in such a way that the absence of
face percolation in Lh implies the absence of continuum percolation in Gweak. Second, we show
that discrete face percolation does not occur in Lh for sufficiently small (but nonzero) λℓ. The
details are presented next.
1) Mapping on a Lattice: We start with some definitions. Let Lh be an hexagonal lattice as
depicted in Fig. 3, where each face is a regular hexagon with side length δ. Each face has a
state, which can be either open or closed. A set of faces (e.g., a path or a circuit) in Lh is said
to be open iff all the faces that form the set are open. We now define when a face is closed
based on how the processes Πℓ and Πe behave inside that face.
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Definition 3.1 (Closed Face in Lh): A face H in Lh is said to be closed iff all the following
conditions are met:
1) Each of the 6 equilateral triangles {Ti}6i=1 that compose the hexagon H has at least one
eavesdropper.
2) The hexagon H is free of legitimate nodes.
The above definition was chosen such that discrete face percolation in Lh can be tied to
continuum percolation in Gweak, as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Circuit Coupling): If there exists a closed circuit in Lh surrounding the
origin, then the component Kweak(0) is finite.
Proof: Assume there is a closed circuit C in Lh surrounding the origin, as depicted in Fig. 4.
This implies that the open component in Lh containing 0, denoted by KLh(0), must be finite.
Since the area of the region KLh(0) is finite, the continuous graph Gweak has a finite number of
vertices falling inside this region. Thus, to prove that Kweak(0) is finite, we just need to show
that no edges of Gweak cross the circuit C. Consider Fig. 3, and suppose that the shaded faces
are part of the closed circuit C. Let x1, x2 be two legitimate nodes such that x1 falls on an
open face on the inner side of C, while x2 falls on the outer side of C (note that Definition 3.1
specifies that the closed faces in C cannot contain legitimate nodes). Clearly, the most favorable
situation for x1, x2 being able to establish an edge across C is the one depicted in Fig. 3. The
edge x1x2 exists in Gweak iff either Bx1(δ) or Bx2(δ) are free of eavesdroppers.12 This condition
does not hold, since Definition 3.1 guarantees that at least one eavesdropper is located inside
the triangle Ti ⊂ Bx1(δ) ∩ Bx2(δ). Thus, no edges of Gweak cross the circuit C, which implies
that Kweak(0) has finite size.
2) Discrete Percolation: Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous to a
discrete model, we now analyze discrete face percolation in Lh.
Proposition 3.2 (Discrete Percolation in Lh): If the parameters λℓ, λe, δ satisfy(
1− e−λe
√
3
4
δ2
)6
· e−λℓ 3
√
3
2
δ2 >
1
2
, (20)
then the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in Lh.
Proof: According to Definition 3.1, the state of a face H in Lh does not depend on the
behaviour of the processes Πℓ and Πe outside H. Because the processes are Poisson, the state of
12We use Bx(ρ) , {y ∈ R2 : |y − x| ≤ ρ} to denote the closed two-dimensional ball centered at point x, with radius ρ.
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different faces is then independent. Then, the model introduced in Section III-C1 can be seen as
a face percolation model on the hexagonal lattice Lh, where each face is closed independently
of other faces with probability
p , P{face H of Lh is closed}
= P
{(
6∧
i=1
Πe{Ti} ≥ 1
)
∧Πℓ{H} = 0
}
=
(
1− e−λe
√
3
4
δ2
)6
· e−λℓ 3
√
3
2
δ2 , (21)
where we used the independence between the processes Πℓ and Πe, and the fact that A{Ti} =
√
3
4
δ2 and A{H} = 3
√
3
2
δ2. Face percolation on the hexagonal lattice can be equivalently described
as site percolation on the triangular lattice. In particular, recall that if
P{H is open} < 1
2
, (22)
then the open component in Lh containing the origin is a.s. finite [50, Ch. 5, Thm. 8], and so the
origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed circuit in Lh. Combining (21) and (22), we obtain (20).
We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of Lemma 3.1, whereby pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0 for
sufficiently small (but nonzero) λℓ.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: For any fixed λe, it is easy to see that condition (20) can always be met
by making the hexagon side δ large enough, and the density λℓ small enough (but nonzero). For
any such choice of parameters λℓ, λe, δ satisfying (20), the origin is a.s. surrounded by a closed
circuit in Lh (by Proposition 3.2), and the component Kweak(0) is a.s. finite (by Proposition 3.1),
i.e., pweak∞ (λℓ) = 0.
D. Proof of Lemma 3.2
In this section, we introduce a few definitions and propositions, which are then used to prove
the lemma. We proceed in two intermediate steps. First, we associate with our continuous
iS-graph G a discrete square lattice Ls as well as its dual L′s, and declare an edge in Ls to
be open in such a way that discrete edge percolation in L′s implies continuum percolation in
Gstrong. Second, we show that discrete edge percolation occurs in L′s for sufficiently large (but
finite) λℓ. The details are presented next.
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1) Mapping on a Lattice: We start with some definitions. Let Ls , d ·Z2 be a square lattice
with edge length d. Let L′s be the dual lattice of Ls, constructed by placing a vertex in the
center of every square of Ls, and placing an edge a′ across every edge a of Ls. Since Ls is a
square lattice, it is clear that L′s = Ls+
(
d
2
, d
2
)
, as depicted in Fig. 5. We make the origin of the
coordinate system coincide with a vertex of L′s. Each edge has a state, which can be either open
or closed. We declare an edge a′ of L′s to be open iff its dual edge a in Ls is open. Furthermore,
a set of edges (e.g., a path or a circuit) in Ls or L′s is said to be open iff all the edges that form
the set are open.
We now specify when an edge of Ls (and therefore of L′s) is open based on how the
processes Πℓ and Πe behave in the neighborhood of that edge. Consider Fig. 6, where a denotes
an edge in Ls, and S1(a) and S2(a) denote the two squares adjacent to a. Let {vi}4i=1 denote
the four vertices of the rectangle S1(a) ∪ S2(a). We then have the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (Open Edge in Ls): An edge a in Ls is said to be open iff all the following
conditions are met:
1) Each square S1(a) and S2(a) adjacent to a has at least one legitimate node.
2) The region Z(a) is free of eavesdroppers, where Z(a) is smallest rectangle such that⋃4
i=1 Bvi(rfree) ⊂ Z(a) with13
rfree , g
−1
(
2−̺g(
√
5d)− σ
2
P
(1− 2−̺)
)
. (23)
The above definition was chosen such that discrete edge percolation in L′s can be tied to
continuum percolation in Gstrong, as given by the following two propositions.
Proposition 3.3 (Two-Square Coupling): If a is an open edge in Ls, then all legitimate nodes
inside S1(a) ∪ S2(a) form a single connected component in Gstrong.
Proof: If two legitimate nodes x1, x2 are to be placed inside the region S1(a) ∪ S2(a),
the most unfavorable configuration in terms of MSR is the one where the distance |x1 − x2| is
maximized, i.e., x1, x2 are on opposite corners of the rectangle S1(a)∪S2(a) and thus |x1−x2| =√
5d. In such configuration, we see from (7) that the edge −−→x1x2 exists in G iff g(|xi − xj |) >
2̺g(|xi − e∗|) + σ2P (2̺ − 1), where e∗ is the eavesdropper closest to x1. This is equivalent to
13To ensure that rfree in (23) is well-defined, in the rest of the paper we assume that d is chosen such that d <
1√
5
g−1
(
σ2
P
(2̺ − 1)
)
.
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requiring that
|x1 − e∗| > g−1
(
2−̺g(
√
5d)− σ
2
P
(1− 2−̺)
)
, rfree,
which is a well-defined quantity if d is chosen such that d < 1√
5
g−1
(
σ2
P
(2̺ − 1)
)
. As a result,
the edge x1x2 exists in Gstrong iff both Bx1(rfree) and Bx2(rfree) are free of eavesdroppers. Now,
if Z(a) is the smallest rectangle containing the region ⋃4i=1 Bvi(rfree), where vi are the vertices
of S1(a) ∪ S2(a), then the condition Πe{Z(a)} = 0 ensures the edge xixj exists in Gstrong for
any xi, xj ∈ S1(a) ∪ S2(a), and thus all legitimate nodes inside S1(a) ∪ S2(a) form a single
connected component in Gstrong.
Proposition 3.4 (Component Coupling): If the open component in L′s containing the origin is
infinite, then the component Kstrong(0) is also infinite.
Proof: Consider Fig. 7. Let P = {a′i} denote a path of open edges {a′i} in L′s. By the
definition of dual lattice, the path P uniquely defines a sequence S = {Si} of adjacent squares
in Ls, separated by open edges {ai} (the duals of {a′i}). Then, each square in S has at least one
legitimate node (by Definition 3.2), and all legitimate nodes falling inside the region associated
with S form a single connected component in Gstrong (by Proposition 3.3). Now, let KL′s(0)
denote the open component in L′s containing 0, i.e., the set of vertexes in L′s that are connected
to 0 by some path. Because of the argument just presented, we have |KL′s(0)| ≤ |Kstrong(0)|.
Thus, if |KL′s(0)| =∞, then |Kstrong(0)| =∞.
2) Discrete Percolation: Having performed an appropriate mapping from a continuous to a
discrete model, we now analyze discrete edge percolation in L′s. Let Ns be the number of squares
that compose the rectangle Z(a) introduced in Definition 3.2. We first study the behavior of
paths in Ls with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 (Geometric Bound): The probability that a given path of Ls with length n is
closed is bounded by
P{path of Ls with length n is closed} ≤ qn/Ne , (24)
where Ne is a finite integer and
q = 1− (1− e−λℓd2)2 · e−λeNsd2 (25)
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is the probability that an edge of Ls is closed.
Proof: Using Definition 3.2, we can write
q , P{edge a of Ls is closed}
= 1− P{Πℓ{S1(a)} ≥ 1 ∧ Πℓ{S2(a)} ≥ 1 ∧ Πe{Z(a)} = 0}
= 1− (1− e−λℓd2)2 · e−λeNsd2 ,
where we used the properties of the independent processes Πℓ and Πe. This is the result in (25).
Now, letting P = {ai}ni=1 denote a path of Ls with length n and edges {ai}, we wish to obtain
an upper bound on P{P is closed}. Considering two edges ai, aj ∈ P , the states of these edges
are statistically independent iff
Z(ai) ∩ Z(aj) = ∅. (26)
We consider a subset Q of edges in P , constructed in the following way. Start with the first
edge a1 ∈ P , whose associated region is Z(a1), and add it to the subset Q. Now, determine the
next edge ak ∈ P such that Z(a1) ∩Z(ak) = ∅, and add it to the subset Q. Repeat the process
until there are no more edges in path P . By construction, it is easy to see that Q ⊆ P , and any
two edges in Q have independent states since they satisfy (26). Thus,
P{P is closed} ≤ P{Q is closed}
= qm,
where m = #Q. After careful analysis of Fig. 6, we observe that the rectangle Z(a) has
dimensions M × (M +1) squares, where M = 2 ⌈rfree
d
⌉
+1. Furthermore, starting in edge a, we
can count at most Ne = 8M2 − 1 edges (including a itself) until we reach the next element of
Q. As a result,
m ≥
⌈
n
Ne
⌉
≥ n
Ne
,
and the desired upper bound becomes
P{P is closed} ≤ qn/Ne ,
which is the result in (24). Since rfree in (23) is guaranteed to be finite, then Ns and Ne are also
finite (although possibly large).
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We have just shown that, although there is dependence between the state of different edges
of Ls, the probability of a path of length n being closed decays geometrically as qn/Ne . We can
now use a Peierls argument to study the existence of an infinite component.14
Proposition 3.6 (Discrete Percolation in L′s): If the probability q satisfies
q <
(
11− 2√10
27
)Ne
, (27)
then
P{open component in L′s containing 0 is infinite} > 0. (28)
Proof: We start with the key observation that the open component in L′s containing 0
is finite iff there is a closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0. This is best seen by inspecting
Fig. 7, where the origin is surrounded by a necklace of closed edges in L′s, which block all
possible routes in Ls from the origin to infinity. Thus, the inequality in (28) is equivalent to
P{∃ closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0} < 1. Let ρ(n) denote the possible number of circuits
of length n in Ls surrounding 0 (a deterministic quantity). Let κ(n) denote the number of closed
circuits of length n in Ls surrounding 0 (a random variable). From combinatorial arguments, it
can be shown [52, (1.17)] that
ρ(n) ≤ 4n3n−2.
Then, for a fixed n,
P{κ(n) ≥ 1} ≤ ρ(n)P{path of Ls with length n is closed}
≤ 4n3n−2qn/Ne,
14A “Peierls argument”, so-named in honour of Rudolf Peierls and his 1936 article on the Ising model [51], refers to an
approach based on enumeration. For a simple example, see [52, pp. 16–19].
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where we used the union bound and Proposition 3.5. Also,
P{∃ closed circuit in Ls surrounding 0} = P{κ(n) ≥ 1 for some n}
≤
∞∑
n=1
P{κ(n) ≥ 1}
≤
∞∑
n=1
4n3n−2qn/Ne
=
4q1/Ne
3(1− 3q1/Ne)2 , (29)
for q <
(
1
3
)Ne
. We see that if q satisfies (27), then (29) is strictly less than one, and (28)
follows.
We now use the propositions to finalize the proof of Lemma 3.2, whereby pstrong∞ (λℓ) > 0 for
sufficiently large (but finite) λℓ.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: For any fixed λe, it is easy to see the probability q in (25) can be
made small enough to satisfy condition (27), by making the edge length d sufficiently small,
and the density λℓ sufficiently large (but finite). For any such choice of parameters λℓ, λe, d
satisfying (27), the open component in L′s containing 0 is infinite with positive probability (by
Proposition 3.6), and the component Kstrong(0) is also infinite with positive probability (by
Proposition 3.4), i.e., pstrong∞ (λℓ) > 0.
E. Simulation Results
In this section, we obtain additional insights about percolation in the iS-graph via Monte
Carlo simulation. Specifically, we aim to evaluate the percolation probabilities p⋄∞ as a function
of the density λℓ of legitimate nodes, and thus estimate the corresponding critical densities λ⋄c .
We now describe the simulation procedure for evaluating the percolation probabilities. We
consider a square R with dimensions √A×√A. The area A is adjusted according to A = Nℓ
λℓ
,
where the average number Nℓ of legitimate nodes in R is kept fixed. This ensures that the
simulation time is approximately constant with respect to the parameter λℓ. In the simulations,
we use Nℓ = 5000 nodes and λe = 1m−2. We first place Πℓ{R} ∼ P(λℓA) legitimate nodes and
Πe{R} ∼ P(λeA) legitimate nodes inside R, uniformly and independently.15 The iS-graph G =
15We use P(µ) to denote a discrete Poisson distribution with mean µ.
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{Πℓ, E} is then established using as edge set
E =
{−−→xixj : g(d(xi, xj)) > 2̺g(d(xi, e∗)) + σ2
P
(2̺ − 1), e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
d(xi, ek)
}
, (30)
where d(·, ·) is a toroidal distance metric [53], [54].16 After the iS-graph is established, we
determine the various components in G, Gweak, and Gstrong. The percolation probabilities are
then calculated using the result in Appendix B:
p⋄∞ =
E{N⋄∞}
λℓA
≈ E{N
⋄
largest}
λℓA
, (31)
where ⋄ refers to the weak or strong component, and N⋄largest is the size of the largest component
of the weak or strong iS-graph restricted to the region R. The need for the approximation is
the following: since the simulation region R is finite, it is not possible to determine whether a
node x in R has an infinite component K⋄(x) or not. Thus, the number of nodes in R whose
component K⋄(x) is infinite is approximated by the number of nodes belonging to the largest
component inside R, similarly to [34]. A little reflection also shows that the above approximation
is only reasonable for the weak and strong components, but not for the out- and in-components,
and so we consider only the first two. The expectation in (31) is computed over an ensemble of
20 spatial realizations of Πℓ and Πe.
Figure 8 shows the simulated percolation probabilities for the weak and strong components of
the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ of legitimate nodes. It considers the simplest case of ̺ = 0, for
which the percolation probabilities depend only on the ratio λℓ
λe
.
17 As predicted by Theorem 3.1,
the weak and strong components experience phase transitions as λℓ is increased. Indeed, the
curves p⋄∞(λℓ) exhibit a fast increase immediately after the critical density λ⋄c is reached. The
reason why p⋄∞(λℓ) is not exactly zero for λℓ < λ⋄c is the approximation made in (31): even
though there is no infinite component in such regime, there is a nonzero probability that large
finite components arise, and these contribute to a nonzero E{N⋄largest}. Figure 8 suggests that
λweakc ≈ 3.4m−2 and λstrongc ≈ 6.2m−2, for the case of λe = 1m−2 and ̺ = 0. Operationally, this
16The use of the Euclidean metric |xi − xj | over the finite region R would give rise to boundary effects, since legitimate
nodes near the borders would be isolated with higher probability than the nodes in the middle. The toroidal distance metric,
on the other hand, transforms the square region R into a torus, and minimizes such boundary effects in the simulations. Other
edge correction methods are discussed in [54].
17The proof of this fact is entirely analogous to the proof of [31, Property 3.1].
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means that if long-range bidirectional secure communication is desired in a wireless network,
the density of legitimate nodes must be at least 6.2 times that of the eavesdroppers. In practice,
this ratio must be even larger, because a security requirement greater than ̺ = 0 is typically
required.18 Furthermore, increasing λℓ also leads to an increased average fraction of nodes pstrong∞
which belong to the infinite component, thus ensuring better connectivity of the network.
Figure 9 illustrates the subcritical and supercritical phases of the iS-graph. In Fig. 9(a), we
have λℓ
λe
= 2, and the iS-graph exhibits only small, bounded clusters of legitimate nodes. This
is in agreement with Fig. 8, which suggests that for a ratio of λℓ
λe
= 2, all four out, in, weak,
and strong components are subcritical. In Fig. 9(b), we have λℓ
λe
= 10, and the iS-graph exhibits
a large cluster of connected nodes. This also agrees with Fig. 8, which suggests that for a ratio
of λℓ
λe
= 10, all four out, in, weak, and strong components are supercritical.
Figure 10 illustrates the dependence of the percolation probability pweak∞ on the secrecy rate
threshold ̺. As expected, we observe that the critical density λweakc is increasing with respect to
̺. This is because as we increase the threshold ̺, the requirement Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ for any two
nodes xi, xj to be securely connected becomes stricter. Thus, the connectivity of the iS-graph
becomes worse and a higher density of legitimate nodes is needed for percolation.
Figure 11 illustrates the dependence of the percolation probability pweak∞ on the wireless
propagation effects, such as lognormal shadowing and Rayleigh fading. From the curves, we
observe that λweakc (lognormal) < λweakc (Rayleigh) < λweakc (deterministic), i.e., the randomness
of the wireless channel—as observed in realistic environments—improves long-range secure
connectivity, by decreasing the critical density at which percolation occurs. This phenomenon
contrasts with the behavior of local connectivity, where channel randomness does not change
the PMF of the out-degree Nout [31]. However, channel randomness does affect the PMF of the
in-degree Nin, as well as the statistical dependencies between the degrees of different nodes, and
therefore affects the properties of multi-hop connectivity.19 Furthermore, we conclude that by
18The critical densities λ⋄c(λe, ̺) are non-decreasing functions of λe and ̺, as can be shown using a coupling argument similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.3.
19Note that in the absence of fading, the degrees of different legitimate nodes are statistically dependent, because different
edges depend on a common underlying process Πe of eavesdroppers. For example, given that a legitimate node is isolated (due
to the proximity of an eavesdropper), then it is also likely that nearby legitimate nodes will also be isolated. By introducing
random fading, such dependence on the underlying eavesdropper process is decreased, and multi-hop connectivity is improved.
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assuming the absence of fading—as we do in the majority of this chapter to ensure mathematical
tractability—we are in effect considering the most pessimistic scenario in terms of long-range
secure connectivity.
IV. FULL CONNECTIVITY IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
In the previous sections, we studied percolation in the iS-graph defined over the infinite plane.
We showed that for some combinations of the parameters (λℓ, λe, ̺), the regime is supercritical
and an infinite component arises. However, the existence of an infinite component does not
ensure connectivity between any two nodes, e.g., one node inside the infinite component cannot
communicate with a node outside. In this sense, percolation ensures only partial connectivity
of the network. In some scenarios, it is of interest to guarantee full connectivity, i.e., that all
nodes can communicate with each other, possibly through multiple hops. Note, however, that
for networks defined over an infinite region, the probability of full connectivity is exactly zero.
Thus, to study of full connectivity, we need to restrict our attention to a finite region R.
Throughout this section, we consider the simplest case of ̺ = 0, i.e., the existence of secure
links with a positive (but possibly small) MSR. Because this scenario is characterized by the
simple geometric description in (8), it provides various insights that are useful in understanding
more complex scenarios.20 Furthermore, the case of ̺ = 0 represents the most favorable scenario
in terms of full connectivity, since a higher security requirement ̺ leads to degraded connectivity.
In what follows, we start by defining full connectivity in the iS-graph. We then characterize
the exact asymptotic behavior of full connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate
nodes. Lastly, we derive simple, explicit expressions that closely approximate the probability of
full in- and out-connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes, and determine the accuracy
of such approximations using simulations.
A. Definitions
Since the iS-graph is a directed graph, we start by distinguishing between full out- and in-
connectivity with the following definitions.
20Specifically, the case of ̺ = 0 brings the following mathematical simplifications. First, the iS-graph is completely
independent of channel gain function g(r), thus no assumptions about the propagation model are needed. Second, there
exist simple (often closed-form) expressions for characterizing local connectivity [31] which will be useful in analyzing full
connectivity.
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Definition 4.1 (Full Out-Connectivity): A legitimate node xi ∈ Πℓ ∩R is fully out-connected
with respect to a region R if in the iS-graph G = {Πℓ, E} there exists a directed path from xi
to every node xj ∈ Πℓ ∩ R, for xj 6= xi.
Definition 4.2 (Full In-Connectivity): A legitimate node xi ∈ Πℓ ∩ R is fully in-connected
with respect to a region R if in the iS-graph G = {Πℓ, E} there exists a directed path to xi
from every node xj ∈ Πℓ ∩ R, for xj 6= xi.21
Since the iS-graph is a random graph, we can consider the probabilities of a node xi being
fully out- or in-connected. For analysis purposes, we consider that probe legitimate node (node 0)
placed at the origin of the coordinate system, i.e., xprobe = 0 ∈ R. We then define pout−con and
pin−con as the probability that node 0 is, respectively, fully out- and fully in-connected. These
probabilities are a deterministic function of the densities λℓ and λe, and the area A of region R.
Our goal is to characterize pout−con and pin−con.
B. Full Connectivity: Asymptotic Regime
In this section, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of secure connectivity as we increase
the density of legitimate nodes. Specifically, for a fixed region of area A and a fixed density λe
of eavesdroppers, we would like to determine if by increasing λℓ →∞, we can asymptotically
achieve full in- and out-connectivity with probability one.22 Note that a.s. full connectivity can
only be achieved asymptotically, since for any finite λℓ, the probabilities pout−con and pin−con are
strictly less than one.
Definition 4.3 (Asymptotic Out-Connectivity): A legitimate node x ∈ Πℓ∩R is asymptotically
out-connected with respect to a region R with area A if limλℓ→∞ pout−con = 1, for any λe > 0
and A > 0.
21Note that these two definitions imply that that legitimate nodes outside the region R can act as relays between legitimate
nodes inside R. Essentially, we are considering the iS-graph defined on the infinite plane, but are only interested in the full
connectivity of the nodes inside an observation region R. In this paper, we will refer to this as the observation model. In the
literature, other models for finite networks include: i) the restriction model, where the network graph is strictly limited to a finite
square, with no nodes outside the square (e.g., [39]), and ii) the toroidal model, where the network graph is defined over a torus
(e.g., [40]). The main advantage of the observation and toroidal models is their homogeneity, since they eliminate boundary
effects associated with the restriction model, leading to mathematically more elegant results.
22We say that an event occurs “asymptotically almost surely” (a.a.s.) if its probability approaches one as λℓ →∞.
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Definition 4.4 (Asymptotic In-Connectivity): A legitimate node x ∈ Πℓ ∩R is asymptotically
in-connected with respect to a region R with area A if limλℓ→∞ pin−con = 1, for any λe > 0 and
A > 0.23
The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic out-connectivity in the iS-graph.
Theorem 4.1 (Asymptotic Out-Connectivity): For the Poisson iS-graph with λe > 0 and A >
0, the legitimate node at the origin is asymptotically out-connected.
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider that a legitimate node is placed at the origin, and
let the region R be a square of size √A×√A containing at the origin. Let us partition R into
equal subsquares Si of size
√
log λℓ−ǫ(λℓ)
λℓ
×
√
logλℓ−ǫ(λℓ)
λℓ
, such where ǫ(λℓ) > 0 is the smallest
number that the total number Aλℓ
log λℓ−ǫ(λℓ) of subsquares is an integer.
24 This partition is depicted
in Fig. 12(a). A subsquare is said to be full if it contains at least one legitimate node, and empty
otherwise. The probability that a subsquare is full is 1 − e− log λℓ+ǫ(λℓ), and the probability that
every subsquare of R is full is
P

Aλℓ
logλℓ−ǫ(λℓ)∧
i=1
Si is full
 = (1− e− log λℓ+ǫ(λℓ))
Aλℓ
log λℓ−ǫ(λℓ) , (32)
where we used the fact that Πℓ is a Poisson process. When we take the limit λℓ →∞, it is easy
to see that ǫ(λℓ)→ 0 and that (32) converges to one. In other words, the described partition of
R ensures that every subsquare Si will be full a.a.s.
Next, we analyze the secure connectivity between legitimate nodes belonging to adjacent
subsquares of R. Recall Fig. 6, where S1 and S2 denote two adjacent squares. Using an argument
analogous to Section III-D1, we know that if the 7×8-subsquare rectangle (Z(a) in the figure) is
free of eavesdroppers, then all legitimate nodes inside S1∪S2 form a single strong component.25
Now consider a region Rsc ⊆ R constructed in the following way. For every possible pair of
23In our study of asymptotic connectivity, it is irrelevant whether we consider the observational, restriction, or toroidal model.
The reason is that, as we shall see, full connectivity is determined by the behavior of the legitimate nodes in the vicinity of the
eavesdroppers. Therefore, when we let λℓ → ∞, there exist enough legitimate nodes between the border of the region R and
any eavesdropper, so the border effects essentially vanish before they can affect the vicinity of the eavesdroppers (and thus, full
connectivity).
24We have explicitly indicated the dependence of ǫ on λℓ, and for simplicity omitted its dependence on A (which will be
kept fixed).
25Note that here we are considering the case of ̺ = 0, while the discussion in Section III-D1 was valid for nonzero ̺ as well.
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adjacent subsquares (Si,Sj) in R, determine whether the associated rectangle Z(Si,Sj) is free
of eavesdroppers. If so, update Rsc such that it now becomes Rsc ∪Si ∪ Sj . Repeat the process
until there are no more pairs of adjacent subsquares. With this definition, it is possible for large
enough λℓ to partition the square R into two regions as
R = Rsc ∪ Re,
where Re = R\Rsc is simply the remaining region of R after Rsc is constructed as above. This
partition is shown in Fig. 12(a). By construction, it is easy to see that as λℓ approaches infinity
(or, equivalently, the size of the subsquares {Si} approaches zero) the following properties hold
a.s.:
1) The region Re can be decomposed into non-overlapping regions as Re =
⋃Ne
n=1R(n)e ,
where Ne , Πe{R} is the number of eavesdroppers inside R, and R(n)e ⊂ R is a square
of size 7× 7 subsquares centered at the n-th eavesdropper of R. If Ne = 0, then Re = ⊘.
2) The origin belongs to Rsc.
3) There exists a lattice path (i.e., a path composed only of horizontal and vertical segments
inside R) between every two subsquares of Rsc, and thus all legitimate nodes inside Rsc
form a single strong component.
We thus conclude that the origin is a.a.s. out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside Rsc. It
remains to determine whether it is also out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside Re. For that
purpose, we consider the behaviour of the iS-graph in the vicinity of the n-th eavesdropper of
R, which we denote by en.26 We know that a node xi ∈ Πℓ ∩ R(n)e will be in-connected iff
the corresponding Voronoi cell induced by the process Πe ∪ {xi} has at least another legitimate
node [31]. A little reflection shows that as λℓ →∞ this Voronoi cell approaches the half-plane
H(xi) , {y ∈ R2 : |y − xi| < |y − en|},
as depicted in Fig. 12(b). Now, it is easy to see that for every xi ∈ Πℓ ∩ R(n)e , there is a.a.s.
at least one legitimate node inside the region H(xi) ∩ Rsc, and thus every such node xi has
an in-connection from the strong component in Rsc. This argument holds similarly for every
region R(n)e , n = 1, . . . , Ne, and so we conclude that the origin is a.a.s. out-connected to all
26In the trivial case of zero eavesdroppers in R, the origin is out-connected to all legitimate nodes inside R, and the theorem
follows.
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legitimate nodes inside Re, in addition to those in Rsc. This is the result of the theorem and the
proof is concluded.
The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic in-connectivity in the iS-graph.
Theorem 4.2 (Asymptotic In-Connectivity): For the Poisson iS-graph with λe > 0 and A > 0,
we have that
lim
λ→∞
pin−con ≤ 1− 6π
8π + 3
√
3
(1− e−λeA), (33)
i.e., the legitimate node at the origin is not asymptotically in-connected.
Proof: Consider a region R with area A, where a probe legitimate node (node 0) is placed
at the origin. Let and Πℓ{R} and Πe{R} denote the number of nodes in Πℓ ∩ R and Πe ∩ R,
respectively. Consider that the event that there is at least one eavesdropper and one legitimate
node in region R, as depicted in Fig. 13. Let χ1 denote the distance between a arbitrarily selected
eavesdropper e and its closest legitimate node x1 ∈ R, i.e., χ1 , |e− x1|. In addition, let S be
the set of possible locations in R2 where a node can connect to x1, given that x1 is the closest
legitimate node to e, i.e.,
S , {x ∈ R2 : −→x1x is possible ∧ |x− e| > χ1}
= {x ∈ R2 : |x− x1| < χ1 ∧ |x− e| > χ1}
= Bx1(χ1)\Be(χ1),
and is shown in Fig. 13. We now define the event E3 , {Πe{R} ≥ 1∧Πℓ{R} ≥ 1∧Πℓ{S} = 0}.
Note that if there are no legitimate nodes inside S, then x1 is out-isolated, and the origin is not
fully in-connected, i.e., E3 ⊆ E2. As a consequence, we have that
P{E2} ≥ P{E3}
or
1− pin−con ≥ P{Πe{R} ≥ 1 ∧Πℓ{R} ≥ 1 ∧ Πℓ{S} = 0},
which can be manipulated as follows
pin−con ≤ 1− P{Πe{R} ≥ 1 ∧ Πℓ{R} ≥ 1 ∧Πℓ{S} = 0}
= 1− (1− eλEA) · P{Πℓ{R} ≥ 1 ∧Πℓ{S} = 0},
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where we used the fact that Πℓ and Πe are independent processes. We now take limits as λℓ →∞
on both sides while keeping λe and A fixed. For the purposes of determining P{Πℓ{R} ≥
1 ∧ Πℓ{S} = 0}, letting λℓ → ∞ with A fixed is equivalent to letting A → ∞ with λℓ fixed.
In such limiting regime of an infinite area Poisson process, the event {Πℓ{R} ≥ 1} occurs a.s.,
and limλ→∞ P{Πℓ{R} ≥ 1 ∧Πℓ{S} = 0} = P{Πℓ{S} = 0}. Then,
lim
λℓ→∞
pin−con ≤ 1− (1− eλeA) · P{Πℓ{S} = 0}. (34)
To determine P{Πℓ{S} = 0}, we use two facts: 1) when conditioned on χ1, the area of S is
equal to πχ21
(
1
3
+
√
3
2π
)
; and 2) when λℓ →∞, the boundary effects vanish, and the RV ζ , χ21
becomes exponentially distributed with rate πλℓ. Then,
P{Πℓ{S} = 0} = Eχ1{P{Πℓ{S} = 0|χ1}}
= Eχ1
{
exp
(
−λπχ21
(
1
3
+
√
3
2π
))}
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−λℓπζ
(
1
3
+
√
3
2π
))
πλℓ exp(−πλℓζ)dζ
=
6π
8π + 3
√
3
.
With this result, (34) becomes
lim
λℓ→∞
pin−con ≤ 1− 6π
8π + 3
√
3
(1− e−λeA),
which is the bound in (33). Thus, the legitimate node at the origin is not asymptotically in-
connected, and the proof is concluded.
The theorem has the following intuitive explanation. Consider λℓ (or A) large enough that
border effects can be ignored. Given that exactly one eavesdropper occurs inside region R, there
is a constant probability P{Πℓ{S} = 0} = 6π8π+3√3 ≈ 0.62 that the legitimate node closest to
the eavesdropper is out-isolated, and this probability does not decrease with λℓ. In fact, when
λℓ increased, the area of S decreases in such a way that P{Πℓ{S} = 0} remains constant. As a
result, regardless of how large λℓ is made, there is a constant probability of ≈ 0.62 that the nearest
node is out-isolated, and therefore a positive probability that the origin is not in-connected.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show that increasing the density λℓ of legitimate nodes is an
effective way to improve the full out-connectivity, in the sense that the corresponding probability
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approaches one. However, the probability of full in-connectivity cannot be made arbitrarily close
to one by increasing λℓ. In essence, full (in or out) connectivity is determined by the behavior
of the legitimate nodes in the vicinity of the eavesdroppers. It is more likely that a legitimate
node in such vicinity is locally in-connected than out-connected [31, Property 3.3], which is
reflected in the fact that the origin achieves full out-connectivity a.a.s., but not full in-connectivity.
Operationally, this means a node can a.a.s. transmit secret messages to all the nodes in a finite
region R, but cannot a.s.s. receive secret messages from all the nodes in R.
Recall that for the study of full connectivity, we considered only the simplest scenario of
̺ = 0. Using a coupling argument similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3, it is easy to show that
the probabilities pout−con(̺) and pin−con(̺) are decreasing functions of ̺. In other words, the
case of ̺ = 0 represents of the most favorable scenario in terms of full connectivity.
C. Full Connectivity: Finite Regime
We now attempt to characterize full connectivity for a finite density of legitimate nodes. We
start with the simple observation that if node 0 is fully-out connected, then there are no in-isolated
nodes in R. Then, we immediately obtain an upper bound for pout−con as
pout−con ≤ P{no in-isolated nodes in R}. (35)
We would like to express the right-hand side in terms of the individual in-isolation probability
determined in [31, eq. (13)]. In general, this is non-trivial because the in-isolation events for
different nodes are statistically dependent. For example, if legitimate node xA is in-isolated
and node xB is close to xA, then it is most likely that xB is also in-isolated. Full-connectivity
has been previously studied in the case of the Poisson Boolean model for unsecured wireless
networks.27 For such scenario, it has been shown in [35], [55], [56] that as the average node
degree πλr2max becomes large, two phenomena are observed: 1) the isolation events for different
nodes become almost independent; and 2) P{full connectivity} ≈ P{no isolated nodes}, i.e., a
bound analogous to (35) becomes tight. These two facts imply that for the Poisson Boolean
model, the P{no isolated nodes} is both a simple and accurate analytical approximation for
P{full connectivity}, when πλr2max →∞.
27The Poisson Boolean model is an undirected model where each node can establish wireless links to all nodes within a fixed
connectivity range rmax, but to no other.
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We now investigate under which conditions similar phenomena occur in the iS-graph. For
that purpose, we introduce the following definition:
p˜out−con , ENR{(1− pin−isol)NR}, (36)
where NR = Πℓ{R} is the random number of legitimate nodes inside the region R (excluding
the probe node at the origin). The quantity p˜out−con represents the probability that none of the
NR legitimate nodes are in-isolated, under the approximation that the in-isolation events are
independent and have the same probability pin−isol given in [31, eq. (13)]. As we will show
later, this quantity can serve as a good approximation of pout−con, with the advantage that it only
depends on local characteristics (the isolation probabilities) of the iS-graph and is analytically
tractable. This can be shown by rewriting (36) as
p˜out−con =
∞∑
n=0
(λℓA)
n exp(−λℓA)
n!
(1− pin−isol)n
= exp(−λℓApin−isol)
∞∑
n=0
[λℓA(1− pin−isol)]n exp (−λℓA(1− pin−isol))
n!︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= exp(−λℓApin−isol)
= exp
(
−λℓAE
{
e−
λℓ
λe
A˜
})
, (37)
where A˜ is the (random) area of a typical Voronoi cell induced by a unit-density Poisson process.
Here, we used the expression for pin−isol in [31, eq. (13)].
For the case of full in-connectivity, we can proceed in a completely analogous way to write
pin−con ≤ P{no out-isolated nodes in R}, (38)
and
p˜in−con , ENR{(1− pout−isol)NR}
= exp(−λℓApout−isol)
= exp
(
−A λℓλe
λℓ + λe
)
, (39)
where we used the expression for pout−isol in [31, Eq. (18)].
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Furthermore, according to [31, Property 3.3], we know that pin−isol < pout−isol for λℓ > 0 and
λe > 0, and therefore
p˜out−con > p˜in−con.
As as result, in the regime where p˜in−con and p˜out−con closely approximate pin−con and pout−con,
respectively, then pout−con will be typically larger than pin−con. Intuitively, it is easier for an
individual node to be locally in-connected than out-connected, and this fact is reflected in the
global connectivity properties of the iS-graph, in the sense that is easier for the origin to be
fully out-connected (reach all nodes) than fully in-connected (be reached by all nodes).
D. Simulation Results
We resort to Monte Carlo simulations to study full-connectivity in the iS-graph, and in particu-
lar the accuracy of the approximations introduced in the previous section. In our environment, we
define the region R = [−5, 5]m× [−5, 5]m with area A = 100m2. We place Πℓ{R} ∼ P(λℓA)
legitimate nodes and Πe{R} ∼ P(λeA) legitimate nodes inside R, uniformly and independently.
The iS-graph G = {Πℓ, E} is then established using as edge set
E =
{−−→xixj : d(xi, xj) < d(xi, e∗) e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
d(xi, ek)
}
, (40)
where d(·, ·) is a toroidal distance metric, similarly to Section III-E. As discussed in Footnote 21,
our definitions of full connectivity imply that legitimate nodes outside the observation region R
can act as relays to connect other legitimate nodes inside R. Thus, an Euclidean metric |xi−xj |
over the finite region R would again give rise to boundary effects, so we use a toroidal distance
metric to minimize such effects in the simulations. After the iS-graph is established, we check
whether: (a) there are any (in or out) isolated nodes, and (b) the node at the origin is fully (in
or out) connected. Repeating the procedure over an ensemble of 20, 000 spatial realizations of
Πℓ and Πe, we calculate the various probabilities of interest.
Figure 14 considers full out-connectivity, comparing three different probabilities as a function
of λe and λℓ:
• the simulated P{no in-isolated nodes in R}, which is an upper bound for pout−con as given
in (35);
• the analytical p˜out−con, whose expression is given in (37);
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• the simulated probability of full out-connectivity, pout−con.
From the plots, we observe that the analytical curve p˜out−con approximates pout−con surprisingly
well for all λℓ and λe, considering the strong approximations associated with p˜out−con. Further-
more, the approximation becomes tight in the extremes ranges where λℓA → ∞ or λeA → 0
(i.e., pout−con ≈ 1). This corresponds to a regime of practical interest where is desirable to
operate the network, in the sense that secure out-connectivity is achieved with probability very
close to one.
Figure 15 is analogous to Fig. 14, but for the case of full in-connectivity. It compares P{no
out-isolated nodes in R}, pin−con, and p˜in−con, as a function of λe and λℓ. We observe the
approximation of pin−con by p˜in−con becomes tight when λeA → 0 (i.e., pin−con ≈ 1), but not
when λℓA → ∞, unlike what happens for full out-connectivity. The difference in the behavior
of pout−con and pin−con as λℓ →∞ was described in Section IV-B.
In general, based on the simulations we conclude that p˜out−con and for p˜in−con are fairly
good approximations for the corresponding probabilities of full connectivity, for a wide range
of parameters. The main advantage is that p˜out−con and for p˜in−con only depend on the local
characterization of the network, namely on the isolation probabilities, and thus lead to simple
analytical expressions which can be used to infer about the global behaviour of the network.
In particular, they are simple enough to be used in first-order dimensioning of the system,
providing the network designer with valuable insights on how pout−con and pin−con vary with the
parameters λℓ, λe, and A.
V. CONCLUSION
The iS-graph captures the connections that can be established with MSR exceeding a thresh-
old ̺, in a large-scale networks. In [31], we characterized the local properties of the iS-graph,
including the degrees and MSR of a typical node with respect to its neighbours. In this paper,
we build on that work and analyze the global properties of the iS-graph, namely percolation
on the infinite plane, and connectivity on a finite region. Interestingly, some local metrics such
as the isolation probability, although quite simple to derive, are able to provide insights into the
more complex phenomena such as global connectivity.
We first characterized percolation of the Poisson iS-graph on the infinite plane. We showed
that each of the four components of the iS-graph (in, out, weak, and strong) experiences a
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phase transition at some nontrivial critical density λ⋄c of legitimate nodes. Operationally, this is
important because it implies that long-range communication over multiple hops is still feasible
when a secrecy constraint is present. We proved that percolation can occur for any prescribed
infimum secrecy rate ̺ satisfying ̺ < ̺max = log2
(
1 + P ·g(0)
σ2
)
, as long as the density of
legitimate nodes is made large enough. This implies that for unbounded path loss models,
percolation can occur for any arbitrarily large secrecy requirement ̺, while for bounded models
the desired ̺ may be too high to allow percolation. Our results also show that as long as
̺ < ̺max, percolation can be achieved even in cases where the eavesdroppers are arbitrarily
dense, by making the density of legitimate nodes large enough.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, we obtained estimates for the critical densities λ⋄c . In the case
of ̺ = 0, for example, we estimated that if the density of eavesdroppers is larger than roughly
30% that of the legitimate nodes, long-range communication in the weak iS-graph is completely
disrupted, in the sense that no infinite cluster arises. In the strong iS-graph, we estimated this
fraction to be about 16%. For a larger secrecy requirement ̺, an even more modest fraction of
attackers is enough to disrupt the network.
Besides considering the existence of an unbounded component on the infinite plane, we
also analyzed the existence of a fully-connected iS-graph on a finite region. Specifically, we
characterized the asymptotic behavior of secure full connectivity for a large density λℓ of
legitimate nodes. In particular, we showed pout−con approaches one as λℓ → ∞, and therefore
full out-connectivity can be improved as much as desired by deploying more legitimate nodes.
Full in-connectivity, however, remains bounded away from one, regardless of how large λℓ is
made. Operationally, this means a node can a.a.s. transmit secret messages to all the nodes in a
finite region R, but cannot a.s.s. receive secret messages from all the nodes in R.
We derived simple expressions that closely approximate pout−con and pin−con for a finite
density λℓ of legitimate nodes. The advantage of these approximate expressions is that they
only depend on the local characterization of the network, namely on the isolation probabilities,
and thus lead to simple analytical expressions which can be used to infer about the global
behaviour of the network. In particular, our expressions show that typically pout−con > pin−con,
i.e., it is easier for a node to be fully out-connected (reach all nodes) than fully in-connected (be
reached by all nodes). Our expressions explicitly show that this fact can be directly explained
in terms of the local connectivity: it is easier for an individual node to be locally in-connected
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than out-connected, and this is reflected in the behaviour of global connectivity described above.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, we showed that the approximate expressions are surprisingly
accurate for a wide range of densities λℓ and λe.
We are hopeful that further efforts in combining stochastic geometry with information-theoretic
principles will lead to a more comprehensive treatment of wireless security.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3
Proof: In what follows, we use a coupling argument. For fixed parameters λe and ̺, we
begin with an iS-graph G(λℓ,2) whose underlying process Πℓ has density λℓ,2. We then thin this
process by keeping each point of Πℓ with probability λℓ,1λℓ,2 where λℓ,1 ≤ λℓ,2, such that when
a point is removed, all its in- and out-connections are also removed. Because of the thinning
property [46, Section 5.1], the resulting process of legitimate nodes has density λℓ,1, and we
have therefore obtained a valid new iS-graph G(λℓ,1), with the same parameters λe and ̺ as
before. By construction, the two graphs G(λℓ,1) and G(λℓ,2) are coupled in such a way that
K⋄λℓ,1(0) ⊆ K⋄λℓ,2(0). As a result, the event {|K⋄λℓ,1(0)| =∞} implies that {|K⋄λℓ,2(0)| =∞}, and
it follows that p⋄∞(λℓ,1) ≤ p⋄∞(λℓ,2).
APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE PERCOLATION PROBABILITY
We provide an alternative interpretation for the percolation probability p⋄∞, which is helpful
to perform simulations of the percolation phenomenon.
Proposition B.1: Let R denote a square with dimensions √A × √A, and N⋄∞ denote the
number of legitimate nodes in R whose component K⋄(x) is infinite, i.e.,
N⋄∞ , #{x ∈ Πℓ ∩R : |K⋄(x)| =∞}, (41)
where ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}. Then,
p⋄∞ =
E{N⋄∞}
λℓA
. (42)
Proof: Consider a partition of the square R into M2 subsquares, {Si}M2i=1. A subsquare is
said to be full if it contains exactly one legitimate node, and empty otherwise. Let Ii be a RV
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that has value 1 when Si is full with some node x for which K⋄(x) is infinite, and 0 otherwise.
Then, we have
E{Ii} = P{Ii = 1}
= P{Si full} · P{|K⋄(x)| =∞|Si full}
=
λℓA
M2
exp
(
−λℓA
M2
)
· P{|K⋄(x)| =∞|Si full}
Defining IM ,
∑M2
i=1 Ii, we see that IM approaches N⋄∞ a.s. as M →∞. Thus, we can write
E{N⋄∞} = lim
M→∞
E{IM}
= lim
M→∞
M2E{Ii}
= λℓAp
⋄
∞.
This is the result in (42), and the proof is complete.
The proposition suggests an alternative interpretation for the percolation probability p⋄∞:
although it was defined as the probability that a given node x has an infinite component K⋄(x),
it also represents the average fraction of nodes in region R for which the component K⋄(x) is
infinite.
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Symbol Usage
E{·} Expectation operator
P{·} Probability operator
H(X) Entropy of X
Πℓ = {xi},Πe = {ei} Poisson processes of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
λℓ, λe Spatial densities of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
Π{R} Number of nodes of process Π in region R
Nin, Nout In-degree and out-degree of a node
Bx(ρ) Ball centered at x with radius ρ
D(a, b) Annular region between radiuses a and b, centered at the origin
A{R} Area of region R
K⋄(x) Out, in, weak, or strong component of node x
p⋄∞ Percolation probability associated with component K⋄(0)
λ⋄c Critical density associated with component K⋄(0)
#S Number of elements in the set S
N (µ, σ2) Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
Table I
NOTATION AND SYMBOLS.
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Alice Bob
Eve
Legitimate channel
Eavesdropper channel
encoder
decoder
decoders sˆℓ
sˆe
xn
hnℓ
hne
wnℓ
wne
ynℓ
yne
Figure 1. Wireless wiretap channel.
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Legitimate node
Eavesdropper node
(a) The (directed) graph G. (b) The weak graph Gweak . (c) The strong graph Gstrong.
Figure 2. Three different types of iS-graphs on R2, considering that ̺ = 0 and σ2ℓ = σ2e .
PSfrag replacements
δLh
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closed face
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Figure 3. Conditions for a face H in Lh to be closed, according to Definition 3.1: each of the 6 triangles in H must have at
least one eavesdropper node each, and H must be free of eavesdroppers.
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0
δLh
closed circuit in Lh
open component in Lh
open face in Lh closed face in Lh
Figure 4. A finite open component at the origin, surrounded by a closed circuit.
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0
d
Ls
L′s
open edge in Ls
closed edge in Ls
open edge in L′s
closed edge in L′s
Figure 5. The lattice Ls = d · Z2 and its dual L′s = Ls +
(
d
2
, d
2
)
. We declare an edge of L′s to be open iff its dual edge in
Ls is open.
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d
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Z(a)
rfree
open edge in Ls
closed edge in Ls
Figure 6. Conditions for an edge a in Ls to be open, according to Definition 3.2: the squares S1 and S2 must have at least
one legitimate node each, and the rectangle Z must be free of eavesdroppers. In general, the radius rfree—and therefore the
region Z—increase with the secrecy rate threshold ̺. The figure plots the case of ̺ = 0.
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Figure 7. A finite open component at the origin, surrounded by a closed circuit in the dual lattice.
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Figure 8. Simulated percolation probabilities for the weak and strong components of the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ of
legitimate nodes (λe = 1m−2, ̺ = 0).
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(a) Subcritical graph (λℓ/λe = 2).
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(b) Supercritical graph (λℓ/λe = 10).
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(c) Structure and color legend of the various
graph components of node x = 0.
Figure 9. Percolation in the iS-graph for ̺ = 0. The solid lines represent the edges in Gstrong, while the dotted lines represent
the edges in Gweak .
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Figure 10. Effect of the secrecy rate threshold ̺ on the percolation probability pweak∞ (λe = 1m−2, g(r) = 1r2b , b = 2,
Pℓ/σ
2 = 10).
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Figure 11. Effect of the wireless propagation characteristics on the percolation probability pweak∞ (λe = 1m−2, ̺ = 0,
σdB = 10).
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Figure 12. Auxiliary diagrams for proving that limλℓ→∞ pout−con = 1.
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Figure 13. Auxiliary diagram for proving that limλℓ→∞ pin−con < 1.
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(a) Connection probabilities versus the eavesdropper density λe, for various values of λℓ.
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(b) Connection probabilities versus the spatial density λℓ of legitimate nodes (λe =
0.05m−2).
Figure 14. Full out-connectivity in the Poisson iS-graph (A = 100m2, ̺ = 0).
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(a) Connection probabilities versus the eavesdropper density λe (λℓ = 1m−2).
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(b) Connection probabilities versus the spatial density λℓ of legitimate nodes, for various
values of λe.
Figure 15. Full in-connectivity in the Poisson iS-graph (A = 100m2, ̺ = 0).
